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INTRODUCTION
Obviousness is the ultimate condition of patentability.' The
nonobviousness requirement-that inventions must, to qualify for
a patent, be not simply new but sufficiently different that they
would not have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled scientist-is
in dispute in almost every case, and it is responsible for invalidating
more patents than any other patent rule.2 It is also perhaps the
most vexing doctrine to apply, in significant part because the
ultimate question of obviousness has an "I know it when I see it"
quality that is hard to break down into objective elements. That
hasn't stopped the Federal Circuit from trying to find those objective
elements. In the last quarter-century, the court has created a
variety of rules designed to cabin the obviousness inquiry: an
invention can't be obvious unless there is a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine prior art elements or modify existing
technology;' an invention can't be obvious merely because it is
obvious to try;4 and so forth.
In its decision last year in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,'
the Supreme Court rejected the use of "rigid" rules to decide
obviousness cases.6 In its place, the Court offered not a new test, but
a constellation of factors designed to discern whether the person
having ordinary skill in the art (the PHOSITA)7 would likely think
1. See generally NON-OBVIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John
F. Witherspoon ed., 1980).
2. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 209 tbl.2 (1998).
3. See, e.g., In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak,
175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4. See, e.g., In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
5. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
6. Id. at 1739.
7. The statute refers to "a person having ordinary skill in the art ...." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2000). On the PHOSITA abbreviation, see, for example, John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA - The
Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 37
(1991); see also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 4.3 (5th ed. 2001);
Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Ww is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's
Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002). The first known use of the term
PHOSITA appears to be in Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10
990 [Vol. 50:989
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to make the patented invention.8 In short, the Court sought to take
a realistic approach to obviousness-to make the obviousness
determination less of a legal construct and to put more weight on
the factual determination of what scientists would actually think
and do about a particular invention.
As a general principle, this realistic focus is a laudable one. The
too-rigid application of rules designed to prevent hindsight bias had
led to a number of results that defied common sense, including the
outcome of KSR itself in the Federal Circuit. But the realistic
approach has some (dare we say it) nonobvious implications for
evidence and procedure, both in the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) and in the courts. The greater focus on the characteristics of
individual cases suggests a need for evidence and factual
determinations, but the legal and structural framework under
which obviousness is tested means that it is difficult to make and
review those determinations. The realistic approach is also
incomplete, because the obviousness inquiry depends critically on
the counterfactual assumption that the PHOSITA, while ordinarily
skilled, is perfectly informed about the prior art. If we are to take a
realistic approach to obviousness, we should make it a consistent
approach, so the ultimate obviousness determination reflects what
scientists in the field would actually think. So far, despite KSR, it
does not. The result of taking the realistic approach seriously may
be-to the surprise of many-a law of obviousness that is in some
respects more, not less, favorable to patentability than the standard
it displaced.
In Part I, we review the law of obviousness and the likely
substantive effects of the KSR decision. In Part II, we explore the
less-noticed procedural effects of KSR, as both the PTO and the
courts try to inject realism and evidence into a legal framework that
is not designed to evaluate them. Finally, in Part III, we discuss the
ways in which the obviousness inquiry still uses a legal construct
rather than a realistic inquiry into what the PHOSITA would think
of an invention. We argue there that obviousness should be
reconceived as a truly realistic inquiry, one that focuses on what the
IDEA 433, 438 (1966).
8. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734, 1739.
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PHOSITA and the marketplace actually know and believe, not what
they might believe in a hypothetical, counterfactual world.
I. OBVIOUSNESS, BEFORE AND AFTER KSR
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,9 the Supreme Court set out the
framework pursuant to which courts should evaluate whether an
invention is obvious. The Court determined that the ultimate
question of patent validity is an issue of law that depends on certain
underlying facts. It identified the factual inquiries pertinent to a
determination of obviousness as: (1) the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art.10 In addition,
the Court noted the importance of secondary considerations of non-
obviousness derived from the circumstances surrounding the
putative invention."
A. The Prior Art and the Role of the PHOSITA in Evaluating It
Obviousness is determined with reference to whether a purported
invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA; a person who
"thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not
one who undertakes to innovate, whether by patient, and often
expensive, systematic research or by extraordinary insights ...."12 In
Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California,3 the
Federal Circuit set forth the following factors for defining a
PHOSITA: (1) the inventor's educational background; (2) the kinds
of problems confronted in the art; (3) solutions found previously; (4)
the speed of innovation in the art; (5) the level of sophistication of
the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers in the
field.' 4 The court cautioned that not all factors will be relevant in
every case.15 And, although one of the listed factors is the inventor's
9. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 17-18.
12. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13. 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
14. Id. at 696.
15. Id.
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educational background, the court has also recognized that the
PHOSITA cannot be equated with the inventor, because the
inventor is presumptively a person of extraordinary insight or
skill.'6
Although the PHOSITA is described as a "person,"17 the
PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct in at least two respects. First,
the PHOSITA is presumed to be familiar with all of the art in the
area of his or her field, even if that art was secret and would not in
fact have been known. 8 Second, the PHOSITA need not be a single
person; instead, the PHOSITA may be a group of people possessing
skills not typically aggregated in any given human being.'9 Of
16. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But
see Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex, 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (relying on educational
level of the inventor in determining the level of skill in the art); cf. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,
234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (listing factors, but omitting educational background of
inventor). Using the inventor's own background to define a PHOSITA risks making the
inquiry recursive by defining the PHOSITA as someone in possession of the skills or insights
necessary to come up with the invention. Thus, for example, in Sud-Chemie Inc. v. CSP Tech8.
Inc., No. 4:03-CV-003-SEB-WGH, 2006 WL 2246404, at *37 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 4,2006), the court
concluded that the PHOSITA was a Ph.D.-level scientist based in part on testimony that the
technology described in the patents in suit had not been contained in the scientific literature
prior to the patents' issuance and thus it would have required a Ph.D.-level scientist to
address the concepts contained in the patents. Taking this reasoning to its logical extreme,
if one defines the PHOSITA as someone who would already have grasped the contents of a
patent, then many inventions would become obvious.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
18. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[The law] presumes that all prior
art references in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.");
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The
person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the
pertinent prior art.").
19. This principle is relatively well established with respect to the definition of a
PHOSITA for purposes of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 950
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Naquin, 398 F.2d 863, 866 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Technicon Instruments
Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 664 F. Supp. 1558, 1578 (D. Or. 1986) ("If two distinct technologies are
relevant to an invention, then the disclosure will be adequate if a person of ordinary skill in
each of the two technologies could practice the invention from the disclosures."). The leading
treatise argues that "it would seem ... the 'person skilled in the art' within the meaning of
Section 112 is the same as the 'person having ordinary skill in the art' within the meaning of
Section 103 on non-obviousness," 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03[2][b]
(2007), though one of the authors has argued otherwise. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1189-90 (2002). Thus,
although there is a dearth of case law on whether the PHOSITA may be a group of people for
purposes of obviousness, it seems likely that the Federal Circuit would (at least pre-KSR)
endorse that result.
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course, no actual human being would ever meet this standard. So,
under traditional obviousness jurisprudence, obviousness is to be
measured not with respect to what actual skilled people in the field
would know or be motivated to do based on the prior art actually
known to them. Instead, obviousness is to be measured with
reference to a hypothetical construct that virtually by definition
could not exist. And even that construct is only sketchily defined. It
is rare, for instance, that parties spend much time fighting about
who the PHOSITA is, or do more than sketch out a resume with
educational background and years of experience. The PHOSITA
seems curiously disconnected from the inquiry he or she is supposed
to perform.
B. The Problem of Combining References
Most inventions do not spring ab initio from the mind of the
inventor. They build on, improve, or combine things already known
in the world in new and unforeseen ways. Inventions that take the
form of a combination of existing ideas present particular problems
for obviousness analysis. All the elements of the invention are
present in the prior art, but they are not present in the same place
in the prior art. Would the PHOSITA have thought to combine these
two different prior art ideas to make the patented invention? Or is
judicial combination of prior art references selected for the court by
the defendant an example of hindsight bias?2"
Before KSR, the Federal Circuit combated the risk of hindsight
bias in these combination cases by requiring that a party
challenging obviousness prove that the prior art disclosed some
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references. 21
Decisions split on the question of whether that suggestion had to be
present in the prior art references themselves, or whether a
motivation could be implicit in the knowledge or goals of the
20. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) [hereinafter
Patently Non-Obvious 1]; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study
on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1
(2007) [hereinafter Patently Non-Obvious Il).
21. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
994 [Vol. 50:989
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PHOSITA.22 It was this teaching-suggestion-motivation, or TSM,
test that led the Federal Circuit to conclude that the adjustable
electronic sensor gasoline pedal at issue in KSR was nonobvious,
even though both adjustable accelerator pedals and electronic
sensors on (nonadjustable) accelerator pedals were known in the
prior art.23
C. Secondary Considerations
The use of a hypothetical person to decide what scientists in the
real world could do is worrisome. In Graham, the Supreme Court
noted that economic evidence of how the invention was actually
treated in the real world "may have relevancy" to the obviousness
inquiry.24 The Court identified "commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc." as relevant secondary indicia
of the nonobviousness of an invention.25 Other cases have elaborated
upon the "etc." as including the licensing of the patent,26 initial
skepticism by others in the field,27 praise,2" independent simul-
taneous invention by others,29 and copying.3" In order to rely on
evidence of these secondary considerations, there must be a nexus
between the factor and the patented invention.31 Thus, for example,
22. Compare In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) with In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
23. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., No. 04-1152, 2005 WL 23377 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6,
2005).
24. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
25. Id. at 17.
26. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
27. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (finding evidence that "skilled artisans were initially skeptical about the invention"
relevant to nonobviousness).
28. Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminium, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Appreciation by contemporaries skilled in the field of the invention is a useful indicator of
[nonobviousness].").
29. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (evidence
of near-simultaneous invention tended to prove obviousness).
30. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (providing evidence that an accused infringer's copying of the patentee's invention is
"relevant to an obviousness determination").
31. See, e.g., In re DBC, No. 2008-1120, 2008 WL 4764340 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 2008)
(rejecting evidence of commercial success because it could have been attributable to superior
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a defendant seeking to rely on evidence that an invention is
commercially successful must show that its commercial success is
a function of the patented feature, and not some other reason.32 At
the simplest level, this nexus requirement can be satisfied if the
scope of the claims and the patented product are coextensive, in
which case the court will generally presume that the commercial
success is a function of the patented invention." The inquiry is more
complex, however, if the claimed invention is only part of the
product. In that case, the patentee must demonstrate that the
commercial success of the product results from the patent rather
than from nonpatented features.34 This nexus can be established by
evidence that the claimed feature is present in a number of
commercially successful products 5 or even survey evidence that the
claimed feature leads to a competitive advantage.36
In some cases, the Federal Circuit has suggested that an
evaluation of secondary considerations is an essential part of the
obviousness inquiry.37 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has often said
that courts should consider this evidence as a mandatory part of the
"totality of the evidence" used to reach a conclusion regarding
obviousness.3" Moreover, perhaps to emphasize the importance of
these factors, the Federal Circuit has often referred to them as
"objective" rather than "secondary" considerations.39 But theory and
marketing rather than to the invention); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris
Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A nexus between commercial success and the
claimed features is required.").
32. Id. For detailed discussion of the problems in inferring nonobviousness from
commercial success, see, for example, Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New
Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 293; Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
33. Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130.
34. J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
35. Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 816 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak Corp., No. 2007-1554, 2008 WL 4529500 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2008)
(rejecting evidence of commercial success because it was not linked to the novel features of
the invention).
36. Winner Intl Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
37. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662-63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In order to
determine obviousness as a legal matter, four factual inquiries must be made ... [including]
secondary considerations of nonobviousness .... ") (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Richardson-
Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
39. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14,26 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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practice are not always in accord. If the other Graham factors are
sufficiently persuasive, the Federal Circuit has been willing to
dismiss the potential impact of secondary considerations.4" Federal
Circuit jurisprudence likewise provides no clear hierarchy between
secondary considerations, considered as a whole, and the other
three Graham factors. In at least one case, the Federal Circuit has
also implied that some of these secondary considerations are
intrinsically more important than others. In Ecolochem, Inc. v.
Southern California Edison Co., for instance, the court explicitly
gave the three named considerations more weight than those which
collectively fall under the "etc." label.42 In other cases, however, the
courts have drawn no such distinction and treated each of them in
the same fashion.4"
Each of these secondary considerations seems intended to help
determine whether the invention was in fact obvious to those of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. For example,
one of the most commonly invoked secondary considerations of non-
obviousness is commercial success, which requires a showing that
a product met with actual success in the marketplace as a result of
the claimed invention. There is an appealing straightforwardness
to the commercial success argument. If something is both obvious
and lucrative, one wouldn't expect it to remain on the shelf for long:
surely someone would be motivated to seize on an obvious, and
obviously profitable, opportunity. Thus, the logic goes, the fact that
40. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,1131
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (documenting the district court's failure to consider secondary indicia of non-
obviousness harmless error because "these indicators of nonobviousness cannot overcome the
strong evidence of obviousness"); Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Mead Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[The objective factors did not carry sufficient weight to override a
conclusion of obviousness based on the primary considerations."); cf. Applied Materials, Inc.
v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ('CThe
objective evidence of unobviousness is not evaluated for its 'separate knockdown ability'
against the 'stonewall' of the prima facie case .... " (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048
(C.C.R.A. 1976))).
41. 227 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
42. Id. at 1380 ('CThe factors specifically mentioned in Graham, and those that we give the
most weight to in the instant case, are the commercial success of the invention, long-felt but
unsolved needs, and failure of others to invent."); see also Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
43. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Goldlne Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(drawing no distinction between named and unnamed secondary considerations).
2008]
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someone actually commercialized the invention and made a lot of
money doing so, suggests that the invention wasn't obvious.
Otherwise, someone else would have commercialized it already.
Patentees can likewise rely on a long-felt need that was addressed
by the patented invention; the theory being, as above, that the need
would have been addressed by others had the solution been
obvious.44 Similarly, "evidence of failed attempts by others could be
determinative on the issue of obviousness" because the failed
attempts by those others would seem to demonstrate that the
invention was not obvious to them. Evidence of third-party licensing
may also demonstrate that others have looked at the patent and
deemed it sufficiently novel to be worth paying for, although the
courts have recognized that the importance of this factor may be
diminished where it is '"cheaper to take licenses than to defend
infringement suits."'45
All of these objective considerations are, on their face, grounded
in real-world facts. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has noted that "such
real-world considerations provide a colorful ... foundation on which
to rest a nonobviousness determination."46 But while the Federal
Circuit lauds these "real-world considerations," it has declined to
rely on evidence of secondary considerations where that objective
evidence is at odds with the hypothetical nature of the obviousness
construct.47
D. KSR and the Standard of Review
In KSR, the Supreme Court ostensibly made the obviousness
inquiry more "flexible" and pragmatic.48 In rejecting the Federal
Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test,49 the Supreme Court
ostensibly sought to create a test that would be more attuned to the
44. See, e.g., id.
45. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(quoting EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 908 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
46. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
47. See, e.g., Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (discounting expert's testimony that he had been "surprise[d]" by the inventor's work
because the expert was not aware of all the prior art).
48. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007).
49. Id.
998 [Vol. 50:989
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realities of what would actually be obvious to a person of skill in the
art. In purportedly doing so, however, the Court's opinion has also
been read as suggesting that the objective considerations may be
less important than the other Graham factors.
Although the ultimate question of obviousness is an issue of law,
the courts have recognized that obviousness must be determined
with reference to underlying facts, such as the level of ordinary skill
in the art and the scope and content of the prior art, as laid out in
Graham. At the same time that the Supreme Court purported to
make the inquiry more flexible (and presumably fact-driven),
however, it also reaffirmed that obviousness is an issue of law, and
thus particularly appropriate for resolution at summary judgment."°
Nonetheless, in light of the presumption of validity, any factual
questions underlying that determination are to be resolved by clear
and convincing evidence.5'
II. PROCEDURAL EFFECTS OF KSR
A. The Increasing Role of the PHOSITA
KSR is a bit of a Rorschach test, offering language that can be
twisted to support virtually any view of obviousness law. But the
one consistent strand that runs through the opinion is a rejection of
rigid rules, replaced with a case-by-case focus on what actual
scientists in the field would know or could develop with ordinary
inventive skill.52 The Court wants to know whether scientists in this
particular discipline would believe this particular invention to be
obvious. This is evident at a number of points in the opinion:
We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals. Throughout this Court's engagement with the question
50. Id. at 1745-46.
51. Pharmastem Therapeutics, 491 F.3d at 1360.
52. The Court was also motivated by a sense that the Federal Circuit got this particular
case wrong-a sentiment with which we agree-and by a belief that the Federal Circuit erred
too often on the side of upholding doubtful patents. For empirical scholarship calling that
latter sense into question, see, for example, Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the
Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911
(2007); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2051 (2007).
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of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and
flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals
applied its TSM test here....
The combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results....
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and
mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is
incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analysis
cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the
importance of published articles and the explicit content of
issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of
modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this
way....
... There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea
underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a
court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that
limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here,
it errs.'
We expect two effects from this realistic,5 5 case-by-case approach.
First, courts will have to pay more attention than they have in the
last quarter-century to who the PHOSITA is and what he or she
thinks. Although Graham spoke of a requirement to determine "the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,""6 in practice, explicit
factual determinations of the PHOSITA's skill have been rare. 7
Rather, the courts have looked for a suggestion in the art to make
the claimed invention, and have paid less attention to whether those
in the field would have figured out the claimed invention on their
53. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
54. Id. at 1739-41.
55. See also Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A
Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 547 (2008) (referring to KSR as a "more
realistic approach").
56. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
57. Becky Eisenberg says that the Federal Circuit "all but ignored" the perspective of the
PHOSITA before KSR. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from
the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 888 (2004).
1000 [Vol. 50:989
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own.5 8 This must change in the wake of KSR. We expect to see
greater reliance on expert testimony regarding what those of skill
in the art would have known and been capable of developing.59 And
indeed we are starting to see greater Federal Circuit attention to
the level of skill in the art.'
Second, the role of the PHOSITA will expand beyond just
combining existing references to include developing his or her own
ideas. The PHOSITA has been treated in the Federal Circuit as a bit
of a "dullard,"61 aware of the art but devoid of creativity or inventive
skills." By contrast, in KSR, the Supreme Court spoke of the
PHOSITA not simply as someone who combines preexisting work,
but as someone who solves problems by applying a reasonable
amount of ingenuity:
If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable
variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same
reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and
a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it
would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
58. See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (stating that the suggestion test applies to all inventions, not merely those that
combine existing references).
59. We acknowledge that there is language in the Court's opinion suggesting that it might
not be inconsistent with a broad, flexible application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation
standard. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. But that standard will satisfy the Court's opinion only
if it is closely tied to the actual knowledge and capabilities of the PHOSITA. Id. at 1740. For
this reason, we agree with Joe Miller that the change in KSR is more than just one of "verbal
formulae." Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 239
(2008).
60. See, e.g., Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (overturning a district court's fact-finding regarding the level of skill in the art);
Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (substituting the Federal
Circuit's assessment of the level of skill in the art for the district court's).
61. See supra note 12.
62. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("A person of ordinary skill in the art is also presumed to be one who thinks along the line of
conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to innovate .... ); Burk &
Lemley, supra note 19, at 1189; Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 891 (stating that the Federal
Circuit has presumed "that PHOSITA is an uncreative plodder, incapable of making
inventions of his own"); Cecil D. Quillen Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L.
& Bus. REV. 207, 213 (2006) ('The Federal Circuit's 'person of ordinary skill' apparently is a
literalist, without imagination or creativity, unaware of developments pertinent to his or her
work.").
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technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his
or her skill....63
... [T]he analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to
the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.'
Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many
cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings
of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle .... A person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.65
If the PHOSITA is imbued with ordinary creativity in solving
known problems, and need not rely on suggestions or motivations
to combine existing references, the effect should be to make it
easier to find patents obvious and therefore invalid.6 Indeed, in
PharmaStem Therapeutics v. Viacell,67 the Federal Circuit reversed
a jury finding of obviousness because the inventors' "routine
research" may be a valuable contribution, but it does not give rise
to a patentable invention.68
This realism also extends to an evaluation of changed economic
conditions. One of the reasons an invention might be made at a
particular time and not before is not that it was hard or unforeseen,
but that some sort of exogenous shock, such as the development of
a new collateral technology, made it either desirable or feasible for
63. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
64. Id. at 1741.
65. Id. at 1742 (emphasis added).
66. Scholars writing before KSR referred to the noncreative PHOSITA as "tantamount
to having read the nonobviousness requirement out of the statute," Quillen, supra note 62,
at 213; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:
A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 75-76 (2004).
There is some potential for circularity here, as Kevin Collins has pointed out to us. If
PHOSITAs are innovative because they themselves hope to obtain patents-that is, if the
person of ordinary skill in a field is himself a patentee-a rule that makes that innovation
unpatentable if it just reflects ordinary innovation may end up discouraging the very
PHOSITA innovation that is the basis for the standard.
67. 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
68. Id. at 1363-64.
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the first time. 9 For example, the switch from analog to digital
electronic components, or the growth of the Internet, might render
desirable the translation of lots of existing technologies from the old
format to the new.v° Under KSR, these exogenous factors are also
part of the realistic approach a PHOSITA would take to an
invention."' If everyone else is moving their business models online,
doing so should not itself be nonobvious, even if there is no explicit
suggestion to move this particular idea online too. 2 Finally, it
should logically extend to the way in which PHOSITAs work in the
real world-not isolated in an office with prior art "hanging [on] the
walls, 73 but in collaborative teams with an open exchange of ideas.7 4
As a general matter, we think the increased focus on a real-world,
creative PHOSITA is a salutary development. As Becky Eisenberg
has explained, "Active practitioners of a technology bring more to a
problem than may be found in written prior art, including training,
judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge acquired through field
experience."7 5 Applied properly, a PHOSITA-based approach to
obviousness will point courts toward the "right" answer by
investigating the likelihood that others would have developed the
same invention had the patentee not done so.76 And a focus on the
PHOSITA may even lead the Federal Circuit to reject time-worn
presumptions about obviousness in the biotechnology context.77 Our
69. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
505 (2004) (noting that an unexpected development "could trigger a flood of patent
applications" for the new ideas that are suddenly valuable).
70. Id. at 504-05.
71. See Stephen P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over Troubled Water: The
Supreme Court's New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily Apparent and
Benefit the Public, 17 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 127,152-53 (2007) (giving examples of"exogenous
factor[s]" such as the Internet or movies in color).
72. For arguments along these lines, see, for example, Duffy, supra note 69, at 504-05;
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363, 420-21 (2000-
2001).
73. Cf. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.PA. 1966) (setting out the picture of a
PHOSITA working in a lab with prior art taped to the walls around him).
74. See generally Meurer & Strandburg, supra note 55 (making this argument).
75. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 897.
76. Cf. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475, 479, 499-500 (2006) (applying Bayesian analysis to design rules to grant
patents only when the invention would not have been made without the patent).
77. See, e.g., Anna Bartow Laakmann, Restoring the Genetic Commons:A "Common Sense"
Approach to Biotechnology Patents in the Wake of KSR v. Teleflex, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 43, 47, 72-74 (2007) (making this argument). For criticism of the Federal
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optimism is subject to some important caveats, however, which we
explore in Part III.
B. Patentee Reliance on Secondary Considerations
Patentees won't sit still as the standard shifts to make it harder
to show nonobviousness. They will look for whatever tools they have
at hand that will persuade a court that an invention was in fact
nonobvious. As the legal rules that fight hindsight bias, such as the
TSM test, are trimmed back, 8 and as courts spend more time and
energy to use real-world context and knowledge to invalidate
patents, patentees will want to rely more on so-called secondary
considerations of nonobviousness-factors that arise in the
marketplace.
Secondary considerations represent patentees' best hope of
demonstrating nonobviousness in the post-KSR world for several
reasons. First, almost all the secondary considerations the courts
have considered support rather than undermine patentability."v
Courts have held that the commercial success of the invention,' a
long-felt need for the invention,"t the failure of others to make the
invention,82 prior art teaching away from the inventive approach,
copying of the invention by others, and public recognition of the
patentee as the inventor83 are all evidence that can tend to prove
nonobviousness. 4 Invoking these "objective" factors can only help
Circuit's obviousness cases involving DNA, see Burk & Lemley, supra note 19.
78. For criticism of KSR for ignoring the serious problem of hindsight bias, see Gregory
N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court's Failure to Define
Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323
(2008).
79. See John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS& CLARK L. REV. 343,
374 (2008) ("[Slecondary considerations are typically employed to rebut a 'prima facie' case
of obviousness.").
80. See, e.g., Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
81. See, e.g., Arkie Lures, 119 F.3d at 955; Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380.
82. See Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380.
83. See Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REv. 969, 981 (2007) (stating that
industry recognition may prove nonobviousness).
84. See, e.g., Arkie Lures, 119 F.3d at 957-58 (discussing secondary considerations);
Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 n.4, 1382-84; ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 237-38 (4th ed. 2006); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1989) (discussing
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patentees, since the Federal Circuit has held that the absence of
these secondary considerations is not proof of obviousness, but
instead is "neutral."85 Only one secondary consideration-simul-
taneous invention by others-points in the opposite direction, and
the Federal Circuit has been somewhat dismissive of that factor.86
As a result, reliance on secondary considerations, where present, is
close to a no-lose proposition for patentees.8 v
The second advantage for patentees of reliance on secondary
considerations is that they offer a compelling story for the finder of
fact.' As the jury applies a more realistic view of obviousness,
patentees can tell a story that focuses on the actual reception of the
invention in the marketplace, of failure of others, or of dismissal of
the patentee's idea beforehand. Each makes a compelling jury
story-if the world was skeptical, and the patentee's invention
overcame that skepticism, producing unexpected results, it is likely
that the person of ordinary skill wouldn't have taken the approach
the patentee did. 9
secondary considerations).
85. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955,960 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
86. See, e.g., Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 ("[S]imultaneous development may or may not
be indicative of obviousness"; finding that it was irrelevant); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik
GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same); Stewart-
Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suggesting that near-
simultaneous invention should not be considered unless it occurred before the patentee's
invention). For an argument that simultaneous invention should get greater weight in the
obviousness inquiry, see Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of
Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1525, 1534-35 (2007) [hereinafter Proof of Copying]; Tun-Jen
Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 94-96
(2008). Courts in a prior era had given more credence to this evidence. See, e.g., Concrete
Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925) (independent inventions "within a
comparatively short space of time ... are in themselves persuasive evidence that this use ...
was the product only of mechanical or engineering skill").
87. See Lunney, Jr., supra note 72, at 377-78.
88. See Gordon T. Arnold and Shannon Goldapp, "E-Commerce"and ' Business Methods'"--
What Type of Evidence Must a Challenger Use?, 619 PLI/Pat 301 (Practising Law Institute
Oct. 2000) (noting that secondary considerations have the most impact because "[tlhey require
little technical understanding, and they are part of the 'story' of the invention that the fact-
finder, judge or jury, finds interesting").
89. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting an obviousness claim in significant part because of unexpected results and other
secondary considerations).
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Finally, secondary considerations can, in some circumstances,
serve as an antidote to the serious problem of hindsight bias.'
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has referred to secondary considerations
as being "used by the courts in an effort to compensate for
hindsight."'" In the wake of KSR, which undoes the teaching-
suggestion-motivation test as a weapon against hindsight bias, it is
reasonable to expect patentees to rely still more on secondary
considerations for this purpose, particularly given the Federal
Circuit's regular reference to them as the "most probative and
determinative" evidence available on obviousness.92
Whether increased reliance by patentees on secondary
considerations is good for society depends critically on what
considerations the court employs and when. Some secondary
considerations, notably commercial success, have been justly
criticized as requiring unwarranted inferences, particularly where
the patent is only one component of a much larger product.9" One
can also criticize evidence of copying and acquiescence as circular,
because patent enforcement can cause the marketplace to fall into
line, taking a license even to patents they believe should never have
been issued.94 By contrast, as Merges points out, failure of others
constitutes much more direct evidence that coming up with the
90. On the seriousness of the hindsight bias problem in obviousness, see generally
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious I, supra note 20; Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note
20. Interestingly, the latter study suggested that the teaching-suggestion-motivation test did
little to solve the problem. Id. at 5.
91. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
92. See, e.g., Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1996); 3M Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Courts outside the United States use secondary considerations as well. See
Lockwood Sec. Prods. Pty. Ltd. v. Doric Prods. Pty. Ltd. (No. 2) [2007] HCA 21 (Aust. High Ct.
May 23, 2007).
93. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 32, at 331-32; Merges, supra note 32, at 838-42. The
Federal Circuit has imposed a nexus requirement on proof of commercial success, and has
rejected commercial success evidence absent any reason to believe the patented invention
caused the success. See, e.g., Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For praise of long-
felt need and failure of others in the context of KSR, see Joseph Scott Miller, Level of Skill
and Long-Felt Need: Notes on a Forgotten Future, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 579 (2008).
94. See, e.g., Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (2007) (discussing threat
of patent enforcement and fraudulently obtained patents); Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of
Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133 (2008) (arguing that unenforced patents can still threaten
competitors).
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invention wasn't as easy as the defendant now claims. 5 Evidence
that scholars or businesses were "teaching away" from the invention
also is strongly suggestive that PHOSITAs making or reading those
statements would be disinclined to follow the path the inventor
did.96 Burk and Lemley suggest that courts also can take other
considerations, such as the cost of innovation, into account in the
obviousness determination.97 Provided courts take these inference
concerns seriously, secondary considerations can improve the
obviousness inquiry by adding relevant evidence that is more
capable of objective consideration than reliance on expert testimony
about what people of skill in the art would have known a decade or
more before.9"
C. Applying the New Rules: Procedural Problems
The previous two sections have suggested that the nature of the
obviousness inquiry will change after KSR to focus on evidence from
the real world, asking both about what scientists in that real world
would have known or been capable of developing and about how the
market actually reacted to the patentee's invention.
Applying this new legal standard will not be easy. Neither the
PTO nor the courts are currently set up to effectively collect and
analyze this information.
95. Merges, supra note 32, at 862, 866.
96. Simultaneous invention is also a potentially valuable piece of economic evidence,
because if a number of scientists of (presumably) ordinary skill did in fact come up with the
invention, it is likely that it wasn't that hard to do, and it is merely a change in market
demand or outside circumstances that permitted the invention at that particular time.
Further, as Vermont argues, the need for a patent may be smaller in cases of simultaneous
invention, because even if the patentee would not have developed the invention without the
benefit of a patent, it appears others would have. Vermont, supra note 76, at 497-500; Tun-
Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39 (2008).
Nonetheless, one must approach this analysis with at least some caution, because it may be
that simultaneous invention resulted from a patent race that would not have occurred in the
absence of the prospect of a patent reward. See Lemley, Proof of Copying, supra note 86, at
1528-29 (making this point).
97. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1660-62 (2003).
98. The average time between the filing of a patent application and the final resolution
of validity litigation on the resulting patent is 12.3 years, though expert testimony may occur
somewhat before that time if the case ends up being appealed. See Allison & Lemley, supra
note 2, at 236 tbl.11. And, of course, the invention was made even earlier than the filing date.
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1. The PTO
The PTO is inundated with patent applications. It receives about
450,000 applications per year,99 and has roughly a million un-
examined applications pending in the office. It can process as many
applications as quickly as it does-obviously not quickly enough-
because it devotes very little time to the evaluation of each
application. 100 Patent examiners spend on average only sixteen to
eighteen hours per application,10' spread over as much as seven
years.0 2 And those eighteen hours are spread among a variety of
tasks, only some of which involve the evaluation of the invention in
light of the prior art.103
These serious time constraints lead examiners to cabin their
search for prior art to particular categories of art, such as prior
U.S. patents, that are easier to find.'0 4 Their analysis of obviousness
has traditionally been correspondingly limited, comparing the
99. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity,
60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46 (2007) ('The PTO expects more than 450,000 new patent applications
to be filed in 2007.").
100. Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman Tests:
Why the Broken System Leaves Judges Behind, Confused and Demoralized, 941 PLI/Pat 65(Practising Law Institute July 2008) (stating that the patent office pays less attention to U.S.
patents than Americans do to their televisions each week).
101. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (2001).
102. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (tracking patent applications filed in January 2001, some of
which were still pending more than seven years later).
103. The examiner, then, has the burden of reading the application, searching for and
identifying the relevant prior art, reading the relevant prior art, deciding whether the
application should be allowed by comparing the claims to the prior art, and writing an "Office
Action" explaining the reasons why any claims are rejected. After the applicant writes a
response to the examiner's evaluation, this process will normally happen again, and may
happen several more times. The examiner may also conduct an "interview" with the applicant
to discuss allowance in person or over the phone. Finally, there are technical matters that the
examiner must identify and attend to before the patent application is in condition for
allowance. The total average time the examiner spends on all these tasks over the two- to
three-year prosecution of the patent is eighteen hours. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001).
104. Allison and Lemley find that U.S. patents disproportionately cite prior U.S. patents
as prior art, rather than the harder-to-find foreign patents and nonpatent prior art. John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent
Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2120, 2137 (2000).
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application to the elements of prior patents and whatever nonpatent
prior art has been submitted.
KSR will put enormous pressure on this assembly-line approach.
If the most important questions in an obviousness inquiry are real-
world ones-what does the PHOSITA know, what can he or she
accomplish, and how was the invention treated in the marketplace
before and after the patentee came up with it--examiners will need
to collect and evaluate evidence on these facts if they are to do a
decent job of evaluating obviousness.10'5 But it is far from clear how
examiners can acquire this evidence, and even if they do, whether
they will have the time to evaluate it.'o6 Examiners are certainly not
equipped, as courts are, to take testimony from expert witnesses
employed by different parties. Indeed, there aren't even two parties
before the PTO."°7
Further, secondary considerations tend to be after-the-fact
economic evidence that may not be available at all when the
examiner (as opposed to a later court) must decide obviousness.'0 8
Some have celebrated this as a virtue-time may tell whether an
invention is widely imitated, for instance, or simultaneously
developed by others.'0 9 But it is a virtue of which patent examiners
cannot take advantage.
There is no good way for patent examiners to rely on secondary
considerations unless the evidence is available at the time of
examination. Under current PTO practice, there are two basic ways
examiners can try to draw on the knowledge of the PHOSITA." °
105. John M. White, Prior Art and Obviousness 2008. The PTO and CAFC Perspective on
Patent Law Sections 102 and 103, 937 PLI/Pat 13 (Practising Law Institute June/July 2008).
106. To be sure, it is possible that the higher standard of patentability under KSR will
cause fewer applications to be filed, easing the burden on the PTO and allowing examiners
to spend more time on each application. But even if this happens-and we are skeptical that
it will be a significant change, at least in the short run-the fact that the PTO is funded by
application and issue fees means that as applications decline, so will the PTO budget, making
it unlikely that a drop in applications will result in more intensive examination rather than
merely fewer examiners. See, e.g., Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game Theory as a
Tool for Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 374-75 (2008).
107. Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex Parte
Appeals, 37 C.F.R. § 41 (2008).
108. Cf. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 386-87 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (Rich, J.) (celebrating the
hindsight nature of secondary considerations as a benefit: "evidence prevails over surmise").
109. See John F. Duffy, A TimingApproach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343
(2008).
110. A third way is to try to bring neutral outside experts into the PTO process. See
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First, they can simply rely uncritically on factual affidavits filed by
the applicant. Applicants already file affidavits to provide factual
support for a number of issues, including enablement."' They might
respond to KSR by submitting affidavits from experts describing the
knowledge and ability of one of skill in the art and suggesting that
the PHOSITA would not in fact have thought the invention obvious.
Under the time and evidentiary constraints the PTO faces,
examiners may have no choice but to accept these affidavits
uncritically." 2 This is unfortunate. Because these affidavits will not
be subject to cross-examination or to rebuttal by an expert proffered
by an opponent,' 3 they will frequently prove to be unreliable
evidence, and if they are unrebuttable they will make it fairly easy
for applicants to establish nonobviousness.
The alternative approach is for examiners to rely on their own
knowledge or common sense to deem a patent obvious." 4 Examiners
are, after all, generally trained in the technical field in which they
review applications." 5 Perhaps they are themselves PHOSITAs, or
at least experts who can be expected to know what the level of skill
in the art was at the time of the invention." 6 Accordingly, we could
Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 899-905 (making this suggestion). The "peer-to-patent" pilot
project harnesses outside experts to identify relevant prior art, though it doesn't have
outsiders evaluating the ultimate question of obviousness. See Beth Noveck, "Peer to Patent"
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143-51
(2006).
We are doubtful that the PTO can improve ultimate decisionmaking by consulting technical
experts not trained in patent law. The legal definition of obviousness is not the same as an
engineer's understanding of that term, even after KSR, and delegating that ultimate question
to those not trained in patents should be done, if at all, only in a structured adversarial
context like litigation. And while we support the peer-to-patent project as a collector of prior
art that can be an input into that determination, we are far from sure that it could scale
enough to communicate outside information to the PTO on all or most patents.
111. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.05 (8th ed. 2007).
112. See In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing a Board finding
of obviousness because the applicant submitted affidavits on teaching away and unexpected
results, and requiring the Board to give the affidavits weight).
113. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 111, § 2164.05.
114. Eisenberg makes this suggestion. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 898-99.
115. Shannon M. Casey, The Patent Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of Third
Party Participation, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 559, 568 (1995).
116. See In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003):
As persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work, examiners
... are responsible for making findings, informed by their scientific knowledge,
as to the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary skill in the art
and the motivation those references would provide to such persons. Absent legal
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simply trust the knowledge or common sense of the examiner. The
PTO has recognized the need for fact-finding on the subsidiary
Graham factors in its post-KSR guidelines, and has instructed that
"[o]ffice personnel fulfill the critical role of factfinder when resolving
the Graham inquiries.""' 7 The Office suggests that "it may also be
important to include explicit [factual] findings as to how a person of
ordinary skill would have understood prior art teachings, or what a
person of ordinary skill would have known or could have done." '118
This sounds awfully close to a factual conclusion on the ultimate
question of obviousness, although it might be done by technology
group rather than anew for each invention. The problem with this
approach is the mirror image of uncritical reliance on applicant
affidavits. Applicants have little recourse if the examiner simply
announces that he or she knows the invention is obvious.119 It may
also violate existing PTO rules. 2 °
This is a serious problem, one that is likely to come up often in
the realistic obviousness test, and one for which there is not a great
solution. We think the best approach is a hybrid of these two
approaches: the examiner must offer reasons, and not merely a
conclusion, for thinking that the PHOSITA would be able to come up
with the invention. 2' If the examiner does so, the applicant then
has the burden of rebutting those reasons, either by persuading the
examiner that he or she is wrong through argument or, more likely,
error or contrary factual evidence, those findings can establish a prima facie case
of obviousness.
117. Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in View
of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR Int' Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526-27 (Oct.
10, 2007).
118. Id.
119. See Joshua McGuire, Nonobviousness: Limitations on Evidentiary Support, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 182-83 (2003).
120. See Exparte Judd, (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1997) (placing burden of establishing skill in
the art on the examiner). But see Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 291
(2007) (suggesting that examiners can use their common sense by taking "official notice"
under the APA).
121. Chris Cotropia argues persuasively that this was effectively the standard applied by
the Federal Circuit before KSR, under the rubric of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test.
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The "Suggestion
Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1517, 1521, 1528, 1535-39. And it is
consistent with the Benjamin-Rai suggestion that examiners can use "official notice" under
the APA. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 120, at 291.
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by submitting an affidavit explaining the knowledge or ability of
those of skill in the art."2 That affidavit should not be
determinative, however. The examiner should be entitled to reject
the claims in an affidavit if (1) he or she can provide specific reasons
for doing so, and (2) the examiner enlists a second examiner to
independently evaluate the dispute, and that second examiner
agrees with the first. 2 ' This approach is not ideal, but it does
provide a way for the PTO to consider what the Supreme Court has
told us is the most important evidence of patentability.'24
Three implications of this kludge are worth considering. First, the
increased importance that will be placed on affidavits in the PTO
after KSR, coupled with the inability of the examiner to cross-
examine the affiant or seek independent confirmation, raises the
risk of applicants filing misleading affidavits. It may therefore
justify keeping the inequitable conduct doctrine as a deterrent to
such misuse. Second, the risk that an examiner's opinion will be
given controlling weight may be a justification for the otherwise
inexplicable rule requiring the examiner to disprove obviousness,125
rather than requiring the applicant to bear the initial burden of
justifying its entitlement to a patent. If the examiner can act as a
122. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief and
Obviousness in Patent Law 25 CARDozoARTs &ENT. L.J. 995, 1030-31 (2008) (suggesting that
KSR mandates a set of burden-shifting presumptions). We are not convinced that KSR
mandates a burden-shifting approach, but as a practical matter it may be the only way for the
PTO to implement a realistic approach to obviousness.
123. Although there is no procedure in the PTO now for such a second opinion, the PTO
does have a pilot "second pair of eyes review" (SPER) for certain classes of applications. For
some evidence suggesting that SPER works in areas where it is used, see Lemley & Sampat,
supra note 102 (documenting extremely low grant rate where two examiners must agree
before granting a patent). But cf. John R. Allison & Starling Hunter, On the Feasibility of
Improving Patent Quality One Technology At a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 759-63 (2006) (noting that many applicants avoided SPER by
changing their applications to avoid being put in class 705). The SPER as currently used
heightens the burden on the applicant; we would use it here to heighten the burden on the
first examiner to reject a claim. But we think it can be effective in that context as well.
124. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
125. See, e.g., In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing the PTO's burden to come forward with a prima facie case
of invalidity). The Federal Circuit has referred to this as "but a procedural mechanism ...
allocat[ing] ... the burdens of going forward and ... persuasion," not a substantive standard for
breaking ties. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Philippe Signore, There is
Something Fishy About a Presumption of Obviousness, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y
148, 153-56 (2002) (discussing the history of and justification for this presumption).
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PHOSITA substitute, requiring her to justify her instincts may
make sense as a counterweight. Finally, the highly imperfect nature
of this process in the PTO is reason enough not to put too much
reliance on the determination made by the PTO in subsequent
litigation. Only if we have an opportunity to vet these issues more
thoroughly, either in court or in some form of post-grant opposition,
can we be relatively confident of reaching the right outcome. 12
2. The Courts
The increasingly factual nature of the dispute suggests that
obviousness ought to be an issue for the jury. After all, it is the
province of the jury to decide contested issues of fact.
Notwithstanding the intensely factual nature of the obviousness
inquiry, however, the Court has made it clear that it is a question
of law, and that even disputes in expert testimony will not prevent
summary judgment. 127
If we take seriously the idea that obviousness is a question of law,
juries shouldn't determine obviousness at all, but instead merely
resolve special verdict questions on the subsidiary facts. Indeed, this
approach has been adopted as one of two alternatives by the
Northern District of California, which has promulgated model
patent jury instructions,"' and hinted at by the Federal Circuit. 129
The Northern District offers one set of instructions in which the
district court gives only the underlying factual determinations to the
jury, 30 and a second set of instructions in which the district court
also puts the ultimate question of obviousness to the jury"'-
126. For more general arguments along these lines, see generally Lichtman & Lemley,
supra note 99; Lemley, supra note 103.
127. This has actually been the Federal Circuit rule since Aktiebolaget Karlstads
Mekaniska Werkstad v. .T.C., 705 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Curiously, the Supreme
Court had questioned the issue in Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986),
suggesting that district court obviousness decisions might require deference. But in the wake
of KSR it appears they don't.
128. Model Patent Jury Instructions for the Northern District of California, available at
www.cand.uscourts.gov (Nov. 29, 2007).
129. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1343 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(suggesting that special verdict forms that ask specific subsidiary factual questions are
preferable to those that just ask the jury its view of obviousness).
130. Model Patent Jury Instruction 4.3b, supra note 128 (Obviousness Alternative 1).
131. Model Patent Jury Instruction 4.3b, supra note 128 (Obviousness Alternative 2).
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although the instructions caution that such a verdict is merely
advisory, and that the ultimate determination of obviousness
remains within the province of the court. It is worth noting that as
a logical matter, under this regime, there should be no appellate
deference to jury verdicts of obviousness. Instead, there should only
be deference to the predicate factual findings on the prior art, level
of skill in the art, and secondary considerations.'32 Similarly-and
to the surprise of most patent owners-it is only these subsidiary
factual findings that would be subject to the clear and convincing
evidence standard, because an evidentiary burden of proof has no
applicability to a question of law.133
To give only the Graham fact questions to a jury while not
allowing the jury to determine the more subjective question of
whether an invention was in fact obvious seems to us perverse. It
makes little sense to review these more objective determinations
with deference, and yet to review the mushier ultimate conclusion
of obviousness de novo."' After all, the PTO is making an ultimate
conclusion of obviousness; if the patent is presumed valid, then that
determination is presumed to be correct.3 5 Why would we not give
the same deference to the district court's evaluation of the evidence
and what would, in fact, have been obvious to a person skilled in the
art?3 ' An obviousness inquiry that focuses on the real world should
be a question of fact.137 This is not to say that summary judgment is
never appropriate; sometimes there really isn't a good faith dispute
132. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810-11 (1986) (holding that
underlying factual findings are subject to deferential review).
133. For discussion of this point, see Sarnoff, supra note 122, at 1001-02.
134. That is the consequence of treating it as a question of law. See Muniauction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
135. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. Intl Paper Co., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1401, 1411 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(citing Avia Group Intl, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
136. Meurer and Strandburg suggest that while obviousness seems to depend on
technological facts, it makes sense to treat it as a question of law so that courts can bring
policy considerations to bear on the ultimate decision. See Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
547 (2008). We agree that policy should be relevant to obviousness, but we are skeptical that
treating the question as one of law accomplishes that goal. Certainly it has not led the Federal
Circuit to consider policy explicitly. In any event, a better approach would be for patent policy
to inform the choice of considerations that fact-finders must evaluate.
137. This argument has been raised before. See, e.g., Comment, Nonobviousness in Patent
Law: A Question of Law or Fact?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 612, 622-23 (1977) (arguing that
obviousness should be treated as a pure question of fact).
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as to whether an invention is obvious. But a realistic approach
would limit the number of cases in which summary judgment is
appropriate, giving the jury substantially more leeway in evaluating
the obviousness of an invention. After all, the factual issues laid out
in Graham frequently are not really the subject of dispute. In many
(if not most) patent cases, the prior art says what it says. As a
result, the issue is not the content of the prior art, but what
conclusions may be drawn from it-whether, in light of the prior art,
a person of skill would be motivated to come up with the purported
invention. Once the facts are in, the weighing of those facts to make
an ultimate determination of obviousness is supposed to be done
from the perspective of the PHOSITA-and thus should itself be a
factual question. It seems to us that the clear and convincing
evidence standard should apply to the ultimate question of
obviousness, rather than the scope and content of the prior art or
the definition of a PHOSITA. And, in turn, the standard of review
should give deference to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness,
rather than simply what is contained within a particular prior art
reference or the other Graham factors.
III. TAKING REALISM SERIOUSLY
As we have noted, we think the new focus on the real world in
determining obviousness is a good thing, but it is worth noting that
the Court did not go all the way toward a realistic approach. The
inquiry into real-world considerations is significantly biased by the
decidedly counterfactual assumption that the real-world PHOSITA
has possession of all the § 102 prior art, no matter how obscure or
secret.1 8 As the court in Winslow put it, the obviousness analysis
still imagines the PHOSITA sitting in his lab with the prior art
references hanging on the walls all around him.139 But PHOSITAs
in the real world don't work that way. Even if they actually do go
out and read other people's patents-and we are skeptical that this
138. See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that the law
"presumes that all prior art references in the field of the invention are available to this
hypothetical skilled artisan"); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955,
962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed
to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.").
139. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
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happens in most industries' 4°-they certainly don't have access to
every piece of prior art. Much of that art is obscure enough that, in
the real world, the PHOSITA wouldn't have access to it and likely
wouldn't know about it. And some of it is art the PHOSITA cannot
have access to because it is secret at the time of invention.1
4
'
The assumption that the PHOSITA is ordinarily skilled,
ordinarily creative, but perfectly informed fundamentally alters the
nature of the post-KSR inquiry, making it unrealistic in an
important way-and in a way that systematically disadvantages
patentees.44 This is most evident in the application of prior art in
the common case of combination inventions. The fight over the
invention in KSR, like most obviousness fights in the last two
decades, started with two pieces of prior art and asked whether a
combination of those two ideas was a patentable invention.' In
KSR, the prior art elements being combined were well-known, and
it makes sense in that circumstance to inquire whether the
PHOSITA would have some reason to combine them.'4 But acts or
documents that qualify as prior art will not always be reasonably
accessible to the PHOSITA. When the PHOSITA wouldn't have
access to prior art, even after a diligent search, it makes little sense
under a nominally realistic approach to pretend that they did. 4 '
140. Empirical research suggests that scientists don't in fact gain much of their knowledge
from patents, instead turning to other sources. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D
Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES.
POL'Y 1349, 1362-64 (2002). And lawyers often advise their clients not to read patents to avoid
being deemed willful infringers, see Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent
Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-02 (2003), although recent
changes in the law will hopefully reduce this problem.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).(g) (2006).
142. See Michael Ebert, Superperson and the Prior Art, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC Y
657 (1985) (discussing the problems that patentees encounter due to the ordinarily skilled
standard).
143. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734-37 (2007).
144. Id.
145. One doctrine that has in the past been used to limit the art the PHOSITA is assumed
to know is the doctrine of "analogous arts." Under that rule, the PHOSITA is assumed to be
aware of all the art, no matter how obscure, in her discipline or the closest analogue, but not
of art from other disciplines. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992); George J. Meyer
Mfg. Co. v. San Marino Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1970). That doctrine fell into
desuetude in the heyday of the TSM test, because if prior art had to contain an explicit
suggestion that it be combined with another reference it was usually superfluous to ask
whether the second reference was from an entirely different field. But in the wake of KSR we
expect the analogous arts limitation to make a comeback.
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Doing so means that inventions the PHOSITA would not, in fact,
consider obvious in the real world will be treated as obvious in the
courts. The result is that KSR overshoots the mark, ending up with
an unfairly anti-patent result in an effort to counteract an unfairly
pro-patent Federal Circuit rule. What the Court wanted-and what
we want-is something in between: an obviousness analysis based
in the real world.
A review of the cases that created the perfectly-informed-
PHOSITA rule offer little support for it. In Hazeltine Research v.
Brenner,46 the Court held that previously-filed but still secret
patent applications under § 102(e) could be used for obviousness
purposes, but it largely relied on the fact that they were prior art
under § 102, and offered no reason to justify extending their
reach to obviousness under § 103.17 The Court did say that
refusing to extend secret prior art into § 103 "would create an area
where patents are awarded for unpatentable advances in the art,' 48
but this is mere question-begging: the patentee's advance is
"unpatentable" only if one departs from the otherwise-realistic
structure of the obviousness inquiry and deems the PHOSITA aware
of information that in fact he or she could not possibly have known.
It is true that under the realistic approach two people could
ultimately obtain patents on things that were obvious variants of
each other, but that would occur only where the PHOSITA, acting
at the time the second invention was made, could not have known
or suspected the existence of the first invention.'49
In theory, secondary considerations could offer a counterweight
here, bringing back a dose of realism to an obviousness inquiry
146. 382 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1965); see also In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286-87 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (Rich, J., plurality opinion) (reaching the same conclusion for prior art under § 102(g)).
147. The language of § 103(a) requires an inquiry into obviousness in view of "the prior
art," but as Judge Baldwin's concurrence in Bass points out, that term is never defined in the
statute, and does not necessarily suggest that everything in § 102 must constitute "prior art"
under § 103. Bass, 474 F.2d at 1295-96 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Indeed, Congress has
subsequently limited the term by excluding from the reach of § 103 secret prior art that was
developed by the same person, owned by the same company, or even developed by different
companies working together in a joint research agreement. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).
148. Hazeltine, 382 U.S. at 256.
149. Deployed as a standard, this approach would ask what art the PHOSITA would
reasonably have been aware of and limit the obviousness inquiry to that art. An alternative,
rule-based approach would categorically define some categories of art-at the very least, so-
called "secret prior art"-as outside the scope of the PHOSITA's knowledge.
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derailed by a focus on secret or obscure art. But it turns out that the
counterfactual assumption of the perfectly informed PHOSITA in-
fects the secondary considerations analysis as well. A close reading
of the secondary considerations case law reveals that the Federal
Circuit is not, in fact, inquiring into how the real world reacted to
the invention. Instead, it is asking a hypothetical question: would
the invention have achieved commercial success had the world been
aware of all the prior art, including secret or obscure art?5 ' In
Pharmastem, for example, the court rejected the testimony of a
witness on secondary considerations in the real world because the
witness did not take into account prior art that would not have been
available to the PHOSITA."'
This is a mistake. Turning secondary considerations into hypo-
thetical questions defeats the purpose of having them, which is to
look at what actually happened in the world as evidence bearing on
the obviousness of the invention. Commercial success, for example,
teaches us not what would have been obvious to a PHOSITA who
actually knew about all the prior art, but instead what was in fact
obvious to real people in the real world who may well not have
known about arcane developments or printed publications circulated
to small audiences. An invention may be commercially successful
not because it was "known in the prior art" as an abstract and
hypothetical matter, but because it was not in fact known to those
persons working in the field. If the point of the secondary
considerations analysis is to get objective market evidence, it makes
150. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Although commercial success might generally support a conclusion that ... [t]he claimed
invention was non-obvious in relation to what came before in the marketplace, the question
at bar is narrower. It is whether the claimed invention is non-obvious in relation to the ideas
set forth in the ... [prior art] ... articles."); Syntex LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting conclusion that commercial success supported obviousness where
the success "may heavily derive from subject matter that does not on the whole contribute to
the patentable distinctiveness of the ... claims"); J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue
Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that commercial success must have been
caused by differences between patented invention and the prior art); Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool
Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same); In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020
(C.C.P.A. 1966); Burk & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1188 ("The PHOSITA is generally
portrayed as having comprehensive knowledge of the references in the particular art.").
151. Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
see also Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak Corp., 554 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting evidence
of commercial success because it was not linked to the novel features of the invention not
present in the prior art).
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little sense to undermine that evidence by turning it into a
hypothetical question in a counterfactual world in which the
ordinary scientists know about the obscure art. Indeed, doing so
makes even less sense here than in the primary obviousness
analysis. We can imagine courts evaluating the hypothetical
question of what a PHOSITA would have thought if given additional
knowledge. It is hard even to envision what evidence would bear on
the question of whether there would have been a long-felt need for
the invention if the marketplace had been aware of secret prior art,
or whether third parties would have copied the invention in that
circumstance.
We think that obviousness in the wake of KSR should truly be a
realistic test. That means not only that we should inquire into what
the PHOSITA knows, could learn, and would create, but also into
what limits there are on that PHOSITA's knowledge.152 This doesn't
mean that we can dispense with a nexus between the invention and
the commercial success or other objective evidence, but it does mean
that that nexus must focus on the information actually available to
the PHOSITA, not obscure prior art that could not, as a practical
matter, have affected the question of whether the invention caused
the patentee's commercial success or whether the PHOSITA would
have found the results of the invention unexpected.153
CONCLUSION
The immediate effect of KSR's realistic approach was to benefit
accused infringers by eliminating rigid rules that ignored
knowledge and common sense. But the longer-term effect remains
to be seen. If courts keep the remaining rigid rule that ignores
knowledge-the counterfactual assumption that PHOSITAs are
perfectly informed-the result will be to make it harder still to
obtain and enforce patents, even in circumstances when those in the
152. Cf. Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 323,
329 (2008) (arguing for a gold-plated patent proposal in which those patents would be exempt
from invalidation by obscure prior art not reasonably accessible to the PHOSITA).
153. One additional implication of our approach is that in rare circumstances an invention
might be anticipated by obscure art but not obvious in view of that art. Cf. Cohesive Techs.,
Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming a finding of obviousness but
remanding for consideration of anticipation).
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real world would not have found the invention obvious. Similarly,
if courts take seriously the idea that obviousness is a question of
law, the inquiry is likely to be further removed from the healthy-
and fact-based-realism the PHOSITA approach can provide. On
the other hand, if, as we suggest, courts take the new realistic
approach to obviousness seriously, the effect of KSR may actually
be to benefit rather than hurt patent owners. It will also benefit
innovation by ensuring that patents will be valid if, but only if,
those of skill in the art would be unlikely as a practical matter to
have developed the invention.
